Consider a gambler who observes a sequence of independent, non-negative random numbers and is allowed to stop the sequence at any time, claiming a reward equal to the most recent observation. The famous prophet inequality of Krengel, Sucheston, and Garling asserts that a gambler who knows the distribution of each random variable can achieve at least half as much reward, in expectation, as a "prophet" who knows the sampled values of each random variable and can choose the largest one. We generalize this result to the setting in which the gambler and the prophet are allowed to make more than one selection, subject to a matroid constraint. We show that the gambler can still achieve at least half as much reward as the prophet; this result is the best possible, since it is known that the ratio cannot be improved even in the original prophet inequality, which corresponds to the special case of rank-one matroids. Generalizing the result still further, we show that under an intersection of p matroid constraints, the prophet's reward exceeds the gambler's by a factor of at most O(p), and this factor is also tight.
INTRODUCTION
In 1978, Krengel, Sucheston and Garling [18] proved a surprising and fundamental result about the relative power of online and offline algorithms in Bayesian settings. They showed that if X1, X2, . . . , Xn is a sequence of independent, non-negative, real-valued random variables satisfying E [maxi Xi] < ∞, then there exists a stopping rule τ such that
In other words, if we consider a game in which a player observes the sequence X1, X2, . . . , Xn and is allowed to terminate the game at any time, collecting the most recently observed reward, then a prophet who can foretell the entire sequence and stop at its maximum value can gain at most twice as much payoff as a player who must choose the stopping time based only on the current and past observations. The inequality (1) became the first 1 of many "prophet inequalities" in optimal stopping theory. Expressed in computer science terms, these inequalities compare the performance of online algorithms versus the offline optimum for problems that involve selecting one or more elements from a random sequence, in a Bayesian setting where the algorithm knows the distribution from which the sequence will be sampled whereas the offline optimum knows the values of the samples themselves and chooses among them optimally. Not surprisingly, these inequalities have important applications in the design and analysis of algorithms, especially in algorithmic mechanism design, a connection that we discuss further below.
In this paper, we prove a prophet inequality for matroids, generalizing the original inequality (1) which corresponds to the special case of rank-one matroids. More specifically, we analyze the following online selection problem. One is given a matroid whose elements have random weights sampled independently from (not necessarily identical) probability distributions on R+. An online algorithm, initialized with knowledge of the matroid structure and of the distribution of each element's weight, must select an independent subset of the matroid by observing the sampled value of each element (in a fixed, prespecified order) and making an immediate decision whether or not to select it before observing the next element. The algorithm's payoff is defined to be the sum of the weights of the selected elements. We prove in this paper that for every matroid, there is an online algorithm whose expected payoff is least half of the expected weight of the maximum-weight basis. It is well known that the factor 2 in Krengel, Sucheston, and Garling's inequality (1) cannot be improved (see Section 5 for a lower bound example) and therefore our result for matroids is the best possible, even in the rank-one case.
Our algorithm is quite simple. At its heart lies a new algorithm for achieving the optimal factor 2 in rank-one matroids: compute a threshold value T = E [maxi Xi]/2 and accept the first element whose weight exceeds this threshold. This is very similar to the algorithm of Samuel-Cahn [20] , which uses a threshold T such that Pr(maxi Xi > T ) = 1 2 but is otherwise the same, and which also achieves the optimal factor 2. It is hard to surpass the elegance of Samuel-Cahn's proof, and indeed our proof, though short and simple, is not as elegant. On the other hand, our algorithm for rank-one matroids has a crucial advantage over Samuel-Cahn's: it generalizes to arbitrary matroids without weakening its approximation factor. The generalization is as follows. After having selected some set A and considering adding the next element xi, the algorithm asks, "How much reward would a prophet expect if he were forced to start with the set A (not counting the weight of A)? And how much would this decrease if he were forced to start with A ∪ {xi} instead (not counting the weight of A and xi)?" If the weight of xi exceeds half this expected decrease, then we accept it. Otherwise we reject. Note that this algorithm, specialized to rank-one matroids, is precisely the one proposed at the start of this paragraph: the expected value of a prophet who accepts nothing is exactly E [maxi Xi], and the expected value of a prophet who is forced to start already having accepted an element is 0.
We next extend our algorithm to the case in which the feasibility constraint is given by a matroid intersection rather than a single matroid. For intersections of p matroids, we present an online algorithm whose expected payoff is at least 1 4p−2 times the expected maximum weight of a feasible set. The algorithm is a natural extension of the one described earlier, but slightly more complex to account for the change in setting. Having already accepted A and considering xi, the algorithm again considers the expected reward of a prophet forced to start with A versus one forced to start with A ∪ {xi}. With matroid intersections, the expected reward of a prophet doesn't behave as nicely as with a single matroid, so we make two modifications. First, we further restrict the prophet so that the set he accepts is not only feasible when combined with A, but is also a subset of the true max-weight feasible set. This restriction is vacu-ous with a single matroid, as the prophet will always choose such a subset anyway. Second, rather than using the correct feasibility constraints, we pretend that one matroid will be chosen uniformly at random and the constraints from the remaining ones will be ignored. Again, this is vacuous with a single matroid as it will always be chosen. After these modifications to the "prophet," the algorithm is the same: if the weight of xi exceeds half the expected decrease in the prophet's reward, we accept it.
In Section 5 we show that our result for matroid intersections is almost tight: we present a lower bound demonstrating that the ratio 4p − 2 cannot be improved by more than a constant factor.
As mentioned earlier, Bayesian optimal mechanism design problems provide a compelling application of prophet inequalities in computer science and economics. In Bayesian optimal mechanism design, one has a collection of n agents with independent private types sampled from known distributions, and the goal is to design a mechanism for allocating resources and charging prices to the agents, given their reported types, so as to maximize the seller's expected revenue in equilibrium. Chawla et al. [5] pioneered the study of approximation guarantees for sequential posted pricings (SPMs), a very simple class of mechanisms in which the seller makes a sequence of take-it-or-leave-it offers to the agents, with each offer specifying an item and a price that the agent must pay in order to win the item. Despite their simplicity, sequential posted pricings were shown in [5] to approximate the optimal revenue in many different settings. Prophet inequalities constitute a key technique underlying these results; instead of directly analyzing the revenue of the SPM, one analyzes the so-called virtual values of the winning bids, proving via prophet inequalities that the combined expected virtual value accumulated by the SPM approximates the offline optimum. Translating this virtual-value approximation guarantee into a revenue guarantee is an application of standard Bayesian mechanism design techniques introduced by Roger Myerson [19] . In the course of developing these results, Chawla et al. prove a type of prophet inequality for matroids that is of considerable interest in its own right: they show that if the algorithm is allowed to specify the order in which the matroid elements are observed, then it can guarantee an expected payoff at least half as large as the prophet's. Our result can be seen as a strengthening of theirs, achieving the same approximation bound without allowing the algorithm to reorder the elements. Unlike our setting, in which the factor 2 is known to be tight, the best known lower bound for algorithms that may reorder the elements is π/2 ∼ = 1.25.
In order to extend the aforementioned results from singleparameter to multi-parameter domains, Chawla et al. define in [5] a general class of multi-parameter mechanism design problems called Bayesian multi-parameter unit-demand (BMUMD). SPMs in this setting are not truthful but can be modified to yield mechanisms that approximate the Bayesian optimal revenue with respect to a weaker solution concept: implementation in undominated strategies. A narrower class of mechanisms called oblivious posted pricings (OPMs) yields truthful mechanisms, but typically with weaker approximation guarantees; for example, it is not known whether OPMs can yield constant-factor approximations to the Bayesian optimal revenue in matroid settings, except for special cases such as graphic matroids. Without resolving this question, our results lead to an equally strong positive result for the BMUMD: truthful mechanisms that 2-approximate the optimal Bayesian revenue in matroid settings and (4p − 2)approximate it in settings defined by an intersection of p matroid constraints.
Related work
The genesis of prophet inequalities in the work of Krengel, Sucheston, and Garling [17, 18] was discussed earlier. It would be impossible in this amount of space to do justice to the extensive literature on prophet inequalities. Of particular relevance to our work are the so-called multiplechoice prophet inequalities in which either the gambler, the prophet, or both are given the power to choose more than one element. While several papers have been written on this topic, e.g. [13, 14, 15] , the near-optimal solution of the most natural case, in which both the gambler and the prophet have k > 1 choices, was not completed until the work of Alaei [1] , who gave a factor-(1 − 1/ √ k + 3) −1 prophet inequality for k-choice optimal stopping; a nearly-matching lower bound of 1 + Ω(k −1/2 ) was already known from prior work.
Research investigating the relationship between algorithmic mechanism design and prophet inequalities was initiated by Hajiaghayi, Kleinberg, and Sandholm [12] , who observed that algorithms used in the derivation of prophet inequalities, owing to their monotonicity properties, could be interpreted as truthful online auction mechanisms and that the prophet inequality in turn could be interpreted as the mechanism's approximation guarantee. Chawla et al. [5] discovered a much subtler relation between the two subjects: questions about the approximability of offline Bayesian optimal mechanisms by sequential posted-price mechanisms could be translated into questions about prophet inequalities, via the use of virtual valuation functions. A fuller discussion of their contributions appears earlier in this section. Recent work by Alaei [1] deepens still further the connections between these two research areas, obtaining a near-optimal k-choice prophet inequality and applying it to a much more general Bayesian combinatorial auction framework than that studied in [5] .
While not directly related to our work, the matroid secretary problem [3] also concerns relations between optimal stopping and matroids, this time under the assumption of a randomly ordered input, rather than independent random numbers in a fixed order. In fact, the "hard examples" for many natural examples in the matroid-secretary setting also translate into hard examples for the prophet inequality setting. In light of this relation, it is intriguing that our work solves the matroid prophet inequality problem whereas the matroid secretary problem remains unsolved, despite intriguing progress on special cases [7, 16] , general matroids [4] , and relaxed versions of the problem [22] .
Finally, the Bayesian online selection problem that we consider here can be formulated as an exponential-sized Markov decision process, whose state reflects the entire set of decisions made prior to a specified point during the algorithm's execution. Thus, our paper can be interpreted as a contribution to the growing CS literature on approximate solutions of exponential-sized Markov decision processes, e.g. [6, 10, 11] . Most of these papers use LP-based techniques. Combinatorial algorithms based on simple thresholding rules, such as ours, are comparatively rare although there are some other examples in the literature on such problems, for example [9] .
PRELIMINARIES

Bayesian online selection problems.
An instance of the Bayesian online selection problem (abbreviated BOSP) is specified by a ground set U, a downwardclosed set system I ⊆ 2 U , and for each x ∈ U a probability distribution Fx supported on the set R+ of non-negative real numbers. These data determine a probability distribution over functions w : U → R+, in which the random variables {w(x) | x ∈ U} are independent and w(x) has distribution Fx. We refer to w(x) as the weight of x, and we extend w to an additive set function defined on 2 U by w(A) = x∈A w(x). Elements of I are called feasible sets. For a given assignment of weights, w, we let MAX(w) denote the maximum-weight feasible set and OPT(w) denotes its weight; we will abbreviate these to MAX and OPT when the weights w are clear from context.
An input sequence is a sequence σ of ordered pairs (xi, wi) i = 1, . . . , n, each belonging to U × R+, such that every element of U occurs exactly once in the sequence x1, . . . , xn. A deterministic online selection algorithm is a function A mapping every input sequence σ to a set A(σ) ∈ I such that for any two input sequences σ, σ that match on the first i pairs (x1, w1), . . . , (xi, wi), the sets Ai(σ) = A(σ)∩{1, . . . , i} and Ai(σ ) = A(σ ) ∩ {1, . . . , i} are identical. A randomized online selection algorithm is a probability distribution over deterministic ones. The algorithm's choices define decision variables bi(σ) which are indicator functions of the events xi ∈ A(σ). An algorithm is monotone if increasing the value of wi (while leaving the rest of σ unchanged) cannot decrease the value of E [bi(σ)], where the expectation is over the algorithm's internal randomness but not the randomness of σ (if any). A monotone deterministic online selection algorithm can be completely described by a sequence of thresholds T1(σ), . . . , Tn(σ), where Ti(σ) ∈ R+ ∪ {∞} is the infimum of the set of weights w such that i ∈ A(σ ) when σ is obtained from σ by modifying wi to w. Conversely, for any sequence of threshold functions T1, . . . , Tn such that Ti(σ) depends only on the first i − 1 elements of σ and Ti(σ) = ∞ whenever Ai−1(σ) ∪ {i} ∈ I, there is a corresponding monotone deterministic online selection algorithm that selects xi whenever wi ≥ Ti(σ).
Notice that an algorithm as defined above is agnostic to the order in which the matroid elements will be presented, i.e. it has a well-defined behavior no matter what order the elements appear in the input sequence. One could also consider order-aware algorithms that know the entire sequence x1, . . . , xn in advance (but not the weights w1, . . . , wn). In the matroid setting, our factor-2 prophet inequality for orderagnostic algorithms reveals that order-aware algorithms have no advantage over order-agnostic ones in the worst case; it is an interesting open question whether the same lack of advantage holds more generally.
One can similarly distinguish between adversaries with respect to their power to choose the ordering of the sequence. The original BOSP treated in previous work [17, 18] considers a fixed-order adversary. That is, the adversary chooses an ordering (or distribution over orderings) for revealing the elements of U without knowing any of the weights w(x). Our main result is an algorithm that achieves 1 2 OPT (or 1 4p−2 OPT) against a fixed-order adversary. This result combined with the techniques of [5] immediately yields OPMs for single-parameter mechanism design. To extend our results to BMUMD, we must consider a stronger type of adversary. There are many ways that an adversary could adapt to the sampled weights and/or the algorithm's decisions, some more powerful than others. The type of adaptivity that is relevant to our paper will be called an online weightadaptive adversary. An online weight-adaptive adversary chooses the next element of U to reveal one at a time. After choosing x1, . . . , xi−1 and learning w(x1), . . . , w(xi−1), the online weight-adaptive adversary chooses the next xi to reveal without knowing the weight w(xi) (or any weights besides w(x1) through w(xi−1)). Fortunately, the same exact proof shows that our algorithm, without any modification, also achieves 1 2 OPT (or 1 4p−2 OPT) against an online weightadaptive adversary. The connection between BMUMD and online weight-adaptive adversaries is not trivial, and is explained in Section 6.
Matroids.
A matroid M consists of a ground set U and a non-empty downward-closed set system I ⊆ 2 U satisfying the matroid exchange axiom: for all pairs of sets I, J ∈ I such that |I| < |J|, there exists an element x ∈ J such that I ∪{x} ∈ I. Elements of I are called independent sets when (U, I) is a matroid. A maximal independent set is called a basis. If A is a subset of U, its rank, denoted by rank(A), is the maximum cardinality of an independent subset of A. Its closure or span, denoted by cl(A), is the set of all x ∈ U such that rank(A ∪ {x}) = rank(A). It is well known that the following greedy algorithm selects a maximum-weight basis of a matroid: number the elements of U as x1, . . . , xn in decreasing order of weight, and select the set of all xi such that xi ∈ cl({x1, . . . , xi−1}).
ALGORITHMS FOR MATROIDS
In this section we prove our main theorem, asserting the existence of algorithms whose expected reward is at least 1 2 OPT when playing against any online weight-adaptive adversary. Here is some intuition as to the considerations guiding the design of our algorithm. Imagine a prophet that is forced to start by accepting the set A, and let the remainder of A (denoted R(A), defined formally in the following section) denote the subset that the restricted prophet adds to A. Let the cost of A (denoted C(A), defined formally in the following section) denote the subset that the unrestricted prophet selected in place of A. Then the restricted
] for a small constant α, it is not so bad to get stuck holding set A. However, just because A is not a bad set to start with does not mean we shouldn't accept anything that comes later. After all, the empty set is not a bad set to start with. If we can choose A in a way such that for any V we reject with A ∪ V ∈ I,
, then A is not a bad set to finish with. Simply put, we want to choose thresholds that are large enough to guarantee that w(A) compares well to E [w(C(A))], but small enough to guarantee that everything we reject is not too heavy. Indeed, the first step in our anal-ysis is to define this property formally and show that an algorithm with this property obtains a 1 α -approximation.
Detour: The rank-one case
To introduce the ideas underlying our algorithm and its analysis, we start with a very simple analysis of the case of rank-one matroids. This is the special case of the problem in which the algorithm is only allowed to make one selection, i.e. the same setting as the original prophet inequality (1). Thus, the algorithm given in this section can be regarded as providing a new and simple proof of that inequality.
Let the random weights of the elements by denoted by X1, . . . , Xn, and let T = E [maxi Xi]/2. We will show that an algorithm that stops at the first time τ such that Xτ ≥ T makes at least T in expectation. Let p = Pr[maxi Xi ≥ T ]. Then we get the following inequality, for any x > T :
This is true because with probability 1 − p the algorithm accepts nothing, so with probability at least (1 − p) it has accepted nothing by the time it processes Xi. So the probability that the algorithm accepts Xi and that Xi > x is at
and therefore, for all x > T ,
As the first term is clearly at most T , the second term must be at least T . So finally, we write:
Xi which completes the proof of (1).
Defining α-balanced thresholds
To design and analyze algorithms for general matroids, we begin by defining a property of a deterministic monotone algorithm that we refer to as α-balanced thresholds. In this section we prove that the expected reward of any such algorithm is at least 1 α OPT. In the following section we construct an algorithm with 2-balanced thresholds, completing the proof of the main theorem.
To define α-balanced thresholds, we must first define some notation. Let w, w : U → R+ denote two assignments of weights to U, both sampled indepedently from the given distribution. We consider running the algorithm on an input sequence σ = (x1, w(x1)), . . . , (xn, w(xn)) and comparing the value of its selected set, A = A(σ), with that of the basis B that maximizes w (B). The matroid exchange axiom ensures that there is at least one way to partition B into disjoint subsets C, R such that A ∪ R is also a basis of M.
(Consider adding elements of B one-by-one to A, preserving membership in I, until the two sets have equal cardinality, and let R be the set of elements added to A.) Among all such partitions, let C(A), R(A) denote the one that maximizes w (R).
Definition 1. For a parameter α > 1, a deterministic monotone algorithm has α-balanced thresholds if it has the following property. For every input sequence σ, if A = A(σ) and V is a set disjoint from A such that A ∪ V ∈ I, then
where the expectation is over the random choice of w .
Intuitively, Equation 2 guarantees that the set we accept is not too bad. The idea is that by selecting A, we have stopped the prophet from accepting C(A), so we should make sure that w(A) is comparable to E [w (C(A))]. Equation 3 guarantees that any set we reject is not too heavy. A prophet expects reward equal to E [w (R(A))] when adding elements to A, so if there is no way for the gambler to make even
, he is not missing out on much by rejecting everything. Proposition 1 below states formally that this intuition holds.
Proposition 1. If a monotone algorithm has α-balanced thresholds, then it satisfies the following approximation guarantee against online weight-adaptive adversaries:
Proof. We have
because C(A) ∪ R(A) is a maximum-weight basis with respect to w , and w has the same distribution as w. For any real number z, we will use the notation (z) + to denote max{z, 0}. The proof will consist of deriving the following three inequalities, in which wi stands for w(xi).
Summing (6)-(8) and using the fact that Ti +(wi−Ti) + = wi for all xi ∈ A, we obtain
Inequality (6) is a restatement of the definition of α-balanced thresholds. Inequality (7) is deduced from the following observations. First, the algorithm selects every i such that wi > Ti, so
(wi − Ti) + . Second, the online property of the algorithm and the fact that weight-adaptive adversaries do not learn wi before choosing to reveal xi imply that Ti can depend on the revealed pairs (x1, w1), . . . , (xi−1, wi−1) and that the random variables w(xi), w (xi), Ti are independent. As wi = w(xi) and w (xi) are identically distributed, it follows that
and (7) is established. Finally, we apply Property (3) of α-balanced thresholds, using the set V = R(A), to deduce that
Consequently (8) holds, which concludes the proof.
Achieving 2-balanced thresholds
This section presents an algorithm with 2-balanced thresholds. The algorithm is quite simple. In step i, having already selected the (possibly empty) set Ai−1, we set threshold Ti = ∞ if Ai−1 ∪ {xi} ∈ I. Otherwise, imagine that a prophet resamples the sequence and starts over having already accepted Ai−1. Such a prophet would obtain expected reward exactly equal to E [w (R(Ai−1))]. Imagine also a prophet resampling and starting over having already accepted Ai−1 ∪ {xi}. Such a prophet obtains expected reward exactly equal to E [w (R(Ai−1 ∪ {xi}))]. We set Ti equal to exactly half of what a prophet would lose in expectation by accepting {xi}, or formally:
The algorithm selects element xi if and only if wi ≥ Ti. The fact that both (9) and (10) define the same value of Ti is easy to verify. Let B denote the maximum weight basis of M with weights w . = w (C(Ai−1 ∪ {xi})) − w (C(Ai−1)) Property (2) in the definition of α-balanced thresholds follows from a telescoping sum. C(A) ) . The remainder of this section is devoted to proving Property (3) in the definition of α-balanced thresholds. In the present context, with α = 2 and thresholds Ti defined by (9), the property simply asserts that for every pair of disjoint sets
We will show, in fact, that this inequality holds for every non-negative weight assignment w and not merely in expectation. The proof appears in Proposition 2 below. To establish it, we will need some basic properties of matroids. Proof. Part 1 is Corollary 39.12a in [21] . To prove part 2, simply observe that the weight of (R − {φ(v)}) ∪ {v} cannot be greater than the weight of R, by our assumptions on R and φ.
Definition 2 ([21], Section 39.3). If M is a matroid and S is a subset of its ground set, the deletion M − S and the contraction M/S are two matroids with ground set
The next two lemmas establish basic properties of the function S → R(S).
Lemma 2. For any independent set A, the set R(A) is equal to the maximum weight basis of M/A.
Proof. Let B be the maximum-weight basis of M. Over all bases of M/A that are contained in B, the set R(A) is, by definition, the one of maximum weight. Therefore, if it is not the maximum-weight basis of M/A, the only reason can be that there is another basis of M/A, not contained in B, having strictly greater weight. But we know that the maximumweight basis of M/A is selected by the greedy algorithm, which iterates through the list y1, . . . , y k of elements of U −A sorted in order of decreasing weight, and picks each element yi that is not contained in cl(A ∪ {y1, . . . , yi−1}). In particular, every yi chosen by the greedy algorithm on M/A satisfies yi ∈ cl({y1, . . . , yi−1}) and therefore belongs to B. Thus the maximum-weight basis of M/A is contained in B and must equal R(A).
Lemma 3. For any independent set J, f (S) = w (R(S)) is a submodular set function on subsets of J.
Proof. For notational convenience, in this proof we will denote the union of two sets by '+' rather than '∪'. Also, we will not distinguish between an element x and the singleton set {x}.
To prove submodularity it suffices to consider an independent set S + x + y and to prove that We may conclude that
and hence f is submodular as claimed.
Proposition 2. For any disjoint sets A, V such that
Proof. The function f (S) = w (R(S)) is submodular on subsets S ⊆ A ∪ V , by Lemma 3. Hence
Apply Lemma 1 to the independent sets V, R(A) in M/A to obtain a bijection φ such that w (φ(x)) ≥ w (x) and A ∪
The proposition follows by combining (11) and (15) .
One might notice that our choice of thresholds involves computing the expectation of a random variable. In practice, computing our thresholds exactly may be unrealistic. However, it is not hard to see that the work in this section also provides a proof of the following proposition: Proposition 3 can be deduced by observing that decreasing the thresholds cannot possibly hurt the ratio of Property (3), but it might hurt the ratio of Property (2) . We proved Property (2) by simply observing a telescoping sum. It is clear that lower bounding the telescoping sum instead of computing it exactly provides the bound
MATROID INTERSECTIONS
Our algorithm and proof for matroid intersections is quite similar. We need to modify some definitions and extend some proofs, but the spirit is the same.
Generalizing α-balanced thresholds
We first have to extend our notation a bit. Denote the independent sets for the p matroids as I1, . . . , Ip. Denote the "truly independent" sets as I = ∩jIj . Still let w, w : U → R+ denote two assignments of weights to U, both sampled indepedently from the given distribution. We consider running the algorithm on an input sequence σ, where σ = (x1, w(x1) ), . . . , (xn, w(xn) ) and comparing the value of its selected set, A = A(σ), with that of the B ∈ I that maximizes w (B). For all j, the matroid exchange axiom ensures that there is at least one way to partition B into disjoint subsets Cj, Rj such that A ∪ Rj ∈ Ij, and B ⊆ clj(A ∪ Rj ). Among all such partitions, let Cj(A), Rj(A) denote the one that maximizes w (Rj ) (greedily add elements from B to Rj unless it creates a dependency in Ij ). We denote by R(A) = ∩jRj (A) and C(A) = ∪jCj (A). and V is a set disjoint from A such that A ∪ V ∈ I, then
Proposition 4. If a monotone algorithm has α-balanced thresholds for α ≥ 2, then it satisfies the following approximation guarantee against weight-adaptive adversaries when I is the intersection of p matroids:
OPT.
The proof closely parallels the proof of Proposition 1, and is given in the appendix.
Obtaining α-balanced thresholds
This section presents an algorithm obtaining α-balanced thresholds for any α > 1. One can take a derivative to see that the optimal choice of α for the intersection of p matroids is αp = p + p(p − 1). For simplicity, we will instead just use α = 2p, as this is nearly optimal and always at least 2. When α = 2p, the approximation guarantee from Proposition 4 is 1 4p−2 . We now define our thresholds:
In step i, having already selected the (possibly empty) set Ai−1, we set threshold Ti = ∞ if Ai−1 ∪ {i} / ∈ I, and Ti = T (Ai−1, i) otherwise. In other words, each T (A, i, j) is basically the same as the threshold used for the single matroid algorithm if Ij was the only matroid constraint. It is not exactly the same, because R(A) when Ij is the only matroid is not the same as Rj (A) in the presence of other matroid constraints. T (A, i) just sums T (A, i, j) over all matroids.
The proof of Equation (16) follows exactly the proof of Equation (2).
The proof of Equation (17) follows from Proposition 2, although perhaps not obviously. As A∪V ∈ I, we clearly have A ∪ V ∈ Ij for all j. So the hypotheses of Proposition 2 are satisfied for all j. Summing the bound we get in Proposition 2 over all j gives us Equation (17) .
Similar to our thresholds for matroids, our thresholds for matroid intersections are robust to small errors in computation. The same reasoning provides us with the following proposition:
Proposition 5. Let Ti denote the thresholds used by our algorithm to obtain α-balanced thresholds, and let T i denote thresholds used by some other monotone algorithm. Then if T i ≤ Ti ≤ (1 + )T i for all i, the T i are α(1 + )-balanced thresholds.
LOWER BOUNDS
Here we provide two examples. The first is the well-known example of [17] showing that the factor of 2 is tight for matroids. We present their construction here for completeness. The second shows that the ratio O(p) is tight for the intersection of p matroids.
We start with the well-known example of [17] . Consider the 1-uniform matroid over 2 elements. We have w(1) = 1 with probability 1, w(2) = n with probability 1/n and 0 otherwise. Then the prophet obtains 2 − 1/n in expectation, but the gambler obtains at most 1, as his optimal strategy is just to take the first element always.
The example for the intersection of p matroids has appeared in other forms in [3, 5] . Let q be a prime between p/2 and p.
Then let I contain all sets of the form {(i, j1) , . . . , (i, jx)}. Now let w(i, j) = 1 with probability 1/q, and w(i, j) = 0 otherwise, for all i, j. Reveal the elements in any order. No matter what strategy the gambler uses to pick the first element, his optimal strategy from that point on is to just accept every remaining element with the same first coordinate. However the gambler winds up with his first element, he makes at most 1 − 1/q in expectation from the remaining elements he is allowed to pick (as there are at most q − 1 remaining elements, and each has E [w(i, j)] = 1/q). Therefore, the expected payoff to the gambler is less than 2. However, with probability at least (1 − 1/e), there exists an i such that w(i, j) = 1 for all j (as the probability that this occurs for a fixed i is 1/and there aredifferent i's). So the expected payoff to the prophet is Θ(q).
Finally, we just have to show that I can be written as the intersection of q matroids. Let Ix be the partition matroid that partitions U into j Sj = j ∪i {(i, xi + j (mod q))}, and requires that only one element of each Sj be chosen. Then clearly, I ⊆ ∩ x∈Zq Ix as any two elements with the same first coordinate lie in different partitions in each of the Ix. In addition, ∩ x∈Zq Ix ⊆ I. Consider any (i, j) and (i , j ) with i = i . Then when (j − j ) (mod q) = x(i − i ) (mod q), (i, j) and (i , j ) are in the same partition of Ix. As q is prime, this equation always has a solution. Therefore, we have shown that I = ∩ x∈Zq Ix, and I can be written as the intersection of q ≤ p matroids. As the prophet obtains Θ(p) in expectation, and the gambler obtains less than 2 in expectation, no algorithm can achieve an approximation factor better than O(p).
INTERPRETATION AS OPM'S
Here, we describe how to use our algorithm to design OPMs for unit-demand multi-parameter bidders under matroid and matroid intersection feasibility constraints. We begin by recalling the definition of Bayesian multi-parameter unit-demand mechanism design (BMUMD) from [5] . In any such mechanism design problem, there is a set of services, U, partitioned into disjoint subsets J1, . . . , Jn, one for each bidder. The mechanism must allocate a set of services, subject to downward-closed feasibility constraints given by a collection I of feasible subsets. We assume that the feasibility constraints guarantee that no bidder receives more than a single service, i.e. that the intersection of any feasible set with one of the sets Ji contains no more than one element. (If this property is not already implied by the given feasibility constraints, it can be ensured by intersecting the given constraints with one additional partition matroid constraint.)
As in the work of Chawla et al. [5] , we assume that each bidder i's values for the services in set Ji are independent random variables, and we analyze BMUMD mechanisms for any such distribution by exploring a closely-related singleparameter domain that we denote by I copies . In I copies there are |U| bidders, each of whom wants just a single service x and has a value vx for receiving that service. The feasibility constraints are the same in both domains -the mechanism may select any set of services that belongs to I -and the joint distribution of the values vx (x ∈ I) is the same as well; the only difference between the two domains is that an individual bidder i in the BMUMD problem becomes a set of competing bidders (corresponding to the elements of Ji) in the domain I copies . As might be expected, the increase in competition between bidders results in an increase in revenue for the optimal mechanism; indeed, the following lemma from [5] will be a key step in our analysis.
Lemma 4. Let A be any individually rational, truthful deterministic mechanism for instance I of BMUMD. Then the expected revenue of A is no more than the expected revenue of the optimal mechanism for I copies .
A second technique that we will borrow from [5] (and, ultimately, from Myerson's original paper on optimal mechanism design [19] ), is the technique of analyzing the expected revenue of mechanisms indirectly via their virtual surplus. We begin by reviewing the definitions of virtual valuations and virtual surplus. Assume that vx, the value of bidder i for item x ∈ Ji, has cumulative distribution function Fx whose density fx is well-defined and positive on the interval on which vx is supported. Then the virtual valuation function φx is defined by
and the virtual surplus of an allocation A ∈ I is defined to be the sum x∈A φx(vx). Myerson [19] proved the following:
Lemma 5. In all single-parameter domains where bidders have independent valuations with monotone increasing virtual valuation functions, the expected revenue of any mechanism in Bayes-Nash equilibrium is equal to its expected virtual surplus.
The distribution of vx is said to be regular when the virtual valuation function φx is monotonically increasing. We will assume throughout the rest of this section that bidders' values have regular distributions, in order to apply Lemma 5. To deal with non-regular distributions, it is necessary to use a technique known as ironing, also due to Myerson [19] , which in our context translates into randomized pricing via a recipe described in Lemma 2 of [5] .
Our plan is now to design truthful mechanisms M and M copies for the BMUMD domain I and the associated singleparameter domain I copies , respectively, and to relate them to the optimal mechanisms for those domains via the following chain of inequalities. Below, R(·) and Φ(·) denote the expected revenue and expected virtual surplus of a mechanism, respectively, and α denotes the approximation guarantee of a prophet inequality algorithm embedded in our mechanism. Thus, α = 2 when I is a matroid, and more Post price vector (px)x∈J i . 7:
Bidder i chooses an element x ∈ Ji, or possibly nothing at these posted prices. 8:
if x is chosen then 9:
Allocate x to bidder i and charge price px.
10:
A ← A ∪ {x} 11: else 12:
Allocate nothing to bidder i and charge price 0. 13: end if 14: end for generally α = 4p − 2 when I is given by an intersection of p matroid constraints.
Most of the steps in line (19) are already justified by the lemmas from prior work discussed above. The relation R = Φ for mechanisms M copies and OPT copies is a consequence of Lemma 5, while Lemma 4 provides R(OPT copies ) ≥ R(OPT). We will derive the relation Φ(M copies ) ≥ 1 α Φ(OPT copies ) as a natural consequence of the prophet inequality. To do so, it suffices to define mechanism M copies such that its allocation decisions result from running the prophet inequality algorithm on an input sequence consisting of the virtual valuations φx(vx), presented in an order determined by an online weight-adaptive adversary. The crux of our proof will consist of designing said adversary to ensure that the relation R(M) ≥ R(M copies ) also holds.
Given these preliminaries, we now describe the mechanisms M and M copies . Central to both mechanisms is a pricing scheme using thresholds T (A, x) , defined as the threshold Ts that our online algorithm would use at step s when xs = x and the algorithm has accepted the set A so far. (Contrary to previous sections of the paper in which steps of the online algorithm's execution were denoted by i, here we reserve the variable i to refer to bidders in the mechanism, using s instead to denote a step of the online algorithm. Note that the thresholds assigned by our algorithm depend only on A and x, not on s, hence the notation T (A, x) is justified.) Mechanism M, described by the pseudocode in Algorithm 1, simply makes posted-price offers to bidders 1, 2, . . . , n in that order, defining the posted price for each item by applying its inverse-virtual-valuation function to the threshold that the prophet inequality algorithm sets for that item.
To define mechanism M copies , we first define an online weight-adaptive adversary and then run the prophet inequality algorithm on the input sequence presented by this adversary, using its thresholds to define posted prices exactly as in mechanism M above. The adversary is designed to minimize the mechanism's revenue, subject to the constraint that the elements are presented in an order that runs through all of the elements of J1, then the elements of J2, and so on. In fact, it is easy to compute this worst-case ordering by backward induction, which yields a dynamic program presented in pseudocode as Algorithm 2. The dynamic programming table consists of entries V (A, i) denoting the expected revenue that M copies will gain from selling elements of the set Ji+1 ∪ · · · ∪ Jn, given that it has already allocated the elements of A. Computing and storing these values requires exponential time and space, but we are not concerned with making M copies into a computationally efficient mechanism because its role in this paper is merely to provide an intermediate step in the analysis of mechanism M.
The formula for V (A, i) is guided by the following considerations. Since M copies will post prices px = φ −1
x (T (A, x) ) for all x ∈ Ji+1 given that it has already allocated A, it will not allocate any element of Ji+1 if vx < px for all x ∈ Ji+1, and otherwise it will allocate some element x ∈ Ji+1. In the former case, its expected revenue from the remaining elements will be V (A, i + 1). In the latter case, it extracts revenue px from bidder i + 1 and expected revenue V (A ∪ {x}, i + 1) from the remaining bidders. Thus, an adversary who wishes the minimize the revenue obtained by the mechanism will order the elements x ∈ Ji+1 in increasing order of px + V (A ∪ {x}, i + 1). Denoting the elements of Ji+1 in this order by x1, x2, . . . , x k , we obtain the formula
Fx j (px j ) P2( ) = 1 − Fx (px ) P3( ) = px + V (A ∪ {x }, i + 1).
The first term on the right side accounts for the possibility that bidder i + 1 buys nothing, while the sum accounts for the possibility that bidder i+1 buys x , for each = 1, . . . , k: P1( ) is the probability that bidder i + 1 did not buy any of {x1, . . . , x }, P2( ) is the probability that bidder i + 1 is willing to purchase x , and P3( ) is the expected value of V (A, i) given that bidder i + 1 purchases x . Mechanism M copies has already been described above, and is specified by pseudocode in Algorithm 3. We note that M copies does not satisfy the definition of an OPM in [5] , since the price px for x ∈ Ji may depend on the bids by for y ∈ J1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ji−1. However, it retains a key property of OPMs that make them suitable for analyzing multiparameter mechanisms: the prices of elements of Ji are predetermined before any of the bids in Ji are revealed. Corollary 1. A 20-compeitive simple thresholding rule exists for the BOSP when each Fx is identical, and M is uniformly dense.
Proof. We claim that the following simple thresholding rule gets a competitive ratio of 20 for the BOSP: Take n independent samples from Fx (which is the same for all x) and call them w 1 , . . . , w n . Let T denote the ( rank(M)/4 +1) st largest weight and use threshold T . Clearly, if this method for choosing T achieves a competitive ratio of 20, then there exists a deterministic choice of T that achieves a competitive ratio of 20 as well.
Because each Fx is identical, we may sample each wi and w i in the following manner: First, take 2n independent samples from Fx and call the collection of weights w. Then, pick a permutation uniformly at random and permute the weights accordingly (i.e. weights may be swapped between the samples used to set T as well as the online samples). Fixing any collection of weights w and taking expectations with respect to the random permutation of the weights, if VP ( w) denotes the expected value of the prophet and VG( w) denotes the expected value of the gambler using the simple thresholding rule, we will show that VG( w) ≥ VP ( w)/20. We will prove this by showing that this is exactly an execution of the algorithm from [8] when the weights are w.
Let M be a copy of M on a disjoint ground set U , and let M be the direct sum M ∪ M . Then because M is uniformly dense, so is M . Consider any fixed ordering that reveals every element of U before revealing any element of U. If we run the algorithm of [8] , it is clear that we will only accept elements of U, as their algorithm does not accept anything in the first half of the input. It is also clear that their algorithm will choose T in the same manner as our simple thresholding rule. Therefore, the expected weight achieved by their algorithm in this setting is exactly VG( w). Finally, it is clear that the expected weight of the maximum-weight basis of M is exactly 2VP ( w). Because their algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of 40, we must have VG( w) ≥ VP ( w)/20. Proposition 6. There is no constant-competitive simple thresholding rule for the BOSP if the Fx are non-identical, even if M is uniformly dense.
Proof. Let M be the rank-one matroid on two elements, and let M be the partition matroid with n = k i=1 k i−1 disjoint copies of M. Then M is uniformly dense. For i = 0, . . . , k, define Fi to be the distribution that samples k i with probability 1. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, pick k k−i copies of M and let the distribution for one element be Fi−1, and the other be Fi. Order the elements in increasing order of weight.
It is clear that the prophet can obtain i k k−i k i = k k+1 by accepting the heavier element from every partition. It is also clear that whenever we have k i ≤ T < k i+1 that the value obtained by the gambler using threshold T is k k + j>i k k−j k j−1 ≤ 2k k . So no simple thresholding rule can obtain a competitive ratio better than k/2.
